A Security Assessment
of the
Lane County Courthouse
Eugene, Oregon

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT

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A Security Assessment
of the
Lane County Courthouse
Eugene, Oregon

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SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

Security in the Lane County Courthouse in Eugene, Oregon, has come under increasing self-scrutiny during the last year, not because of major headline-making incidents, but because the departments using the building are concerned for the safety of all its occupants, the security of records, equipment, and valuables, and the propriety and privacy of judicial process. The courthouse is relatively large and exceedingly open to unsupervised public access, but its only specific security services are provided as a secondary service by members of the Sheriff's (7 person) Transport Unit, whose primary responsibilities are for transporting prisoners between the jail and other facilities and for the custody of prisoners in the courthouse.

Technical assistance was provided by the Adjudication Technical Assistance Project in Project TA 184. It was conducted and this report was prepared by Lawrence Siegel, a court facility consultant from Columbia, Maryland, who has been working in court facility security, planning, and design since 1971. After reviewing relevant documentation and courthouse plans, Mr. Siegel visited Eugene during the period January 30 through February 1, 1989 to assess courthouse security and discuss the security situation and opportunities with key personnel of court and related agencies.

This report presents the findings and recommendations of Project TA 184, with the purpose of:

1. validating the assessment of courthouse security needs conducted by a multi-agency Courthouse Security Committee over the past years, and
2. providing the committee with
   a) an analysis of priorities for addressing those needs,
   b) estimates of the relative expense, where appropriate, of various recommended measures for addressing those needs, and
   c) a suggested methodology and timetable for addressing the needs.

ORGANIZATION OF REPORT

The report starts with a group of findings, general comments based on my observations and discussions during the site visit, and proceeds to recommendations on thirteen specific topics.
SYNOPSIS

During my conversations with several dozen members of court, sheriff, and county departments, a range of security interests and concerns centering on a few issues quickly became apparent:

A small number of courthouse regulars, persons whose behavior is outlandish and seems beyond their control.

Unsupervised and undesired visitors are too common in the supposedly private corridors leading to the jury rooms and judges' chambers.

Weapons are sometimes brought into the courthouse by visitors.

The alarm system is not working as well as it should be.

When prisoners are being transported on the private elevator, judges, jurors, and court staff should not be sharing the elevator or using the same section of the private corridor.

Staff members are not sure of what constitutes an emergency, to whom they should report it, and what response they should make do when they think one is happening.

The county's security funding is too tight.

The recommendations are directed at meeting those concerns and other pertinent conditions.

Improvements in Lane County court security are feasible, even with limited funding, but additional funding for specific improvements should be sought from new sources, including a court security fee levied on all or some cases.

Additional security officers are needed to provide a constant, observable, authoritative presence and to provide necessary responses to specific situations.
Improvements should be made in the privacy of those spaces which should not have unlimited public access, including a computer-controlled system for all exterior and some interior doors.

Improvements are needed in alarms and emergency communications and in the furniture arrangements of some courtrooms.

Assign proceedings with large numbers of in-custody defendants only to certain courtrooms.

Introduce a system of video arraignments.

Courtroom practices should be adjusted to avoid dockets which may unnecessarily prolong the stays of in-custody defendants in the less-secure courtroom surroundings rather than holding cells.

The juvenile courtroom and the custody referee office should be included among the spaces receiving security improvements.

The clerical counters should be made secure to provide after-hours records security and better staff/public separation.

Security policies and procedures should be established and published and security training should be provided to court personnel.

The Security Committee should meet regularly, with county government participation and support, and should develop and pursue a comprehensive security program.

Overall, it is clear that the security concerns were being voiced by persons seriously committed to keeping the building safe and avoiding future incidents. It is equally clear that the members of the Security Committee, and the departments they represent, are willing and able to cooperate with each other to bring about improvements. From that basis, and building on the excellent start they already have made, we can confidently expect to achieve significant improvements. We can further expect these improvements to appropriately maintain accessibility to this important public building while providing its occupants and the public with the degree of protection from danger and injury they rightly expect. And we can expect that these improvements will be affordable to the people of Lane County.
FINDINGS

FACILITY ISSUES

DESCRIPTION

The four-story Lane County Courthouse is joined to the more-recent Public Service Building on the courthouse's east side through entrances at its basement, first-floor, and second-floor levels and a door from the courthouse third floor to the roof of the Public Safety Building. For access control possibilities they might as well be a single building.

The main courthouse entrance leads to the second floor at the public lobby near the courtrooms and clerical spaces of District Court. Fire stairs with street level access are located on the east and west sides, additional ground level entrances are on the west side, and the routes of access trace throughout the Public Service Building as well as the public streets. One public elevator and one nominally private elevator, the latter used for staff, prisoners, and freight, complete the vertical circulation.

Public circulation on each courthouse floor is primarily along a single east-west corridor connecting the two fire stairs and also reaching the public elevator. Each end of the public corridor meets a private corridor which runs between the courtrooms and the chambers. On the second floor this private corridor occupies the north side of the building and on the third and fourth floors it occupies the north and the south sides. Each connection between the public and private corridors has a door, but only the fourth floor doors, around the District Attorney’s offices, are routinely locked.

An unusual feature of the courthouse is the exterior catwalks that circle the building on the second, third, and fourth floors. Joined at the outside edge by vertical aluminum beams on about three foot centers, they are a decorative and practical sun and rain shade, but their three foot width is accessible through each of the many operable windows and could be used for clandestine access.

There are two sets of holding cells; on the first floor in the Sheriff’s Office and on the second floor opposite District Courtroom No. 1. Both are close to the private elevator which also rises to the third, and fourth floors in the east-side private corridor. Because the sally port for
Sheriff's vehicles is in the Public Service Building, prisoners being moved to and from the Sheriff's Office holding cells are walked across the public corridor and a short elevated walkway between the Public Service Building and the courthouse. Gates can be closed to secure the crossing between the sally port door and the walkway railings.

A security alarm system is installed in the courthouse, with actuators installed in the judges' chambers and courtrooms. The alarms signal at the Sheriff's Dispatcher's position. Response depends on the availability of Sheriff's personnel in the near vicinity of the alarm. No information on the nature of the problem is carried with the alarm signal, itself. Generally, information is sought by telephone in order to respond properly.

Courtrooms in this facility are relatively similar, except that District Courtrooms have seven-person and Circuit Courtrooms fourteen person jury boxes. Courtroom dimensions and interior arrangements do not differ markedly from one to another and most are assigned all types of cases. Staff in District Courtrooms includes the judge and one clerk/bailiff/reporter, with one or two more clerical types during arraignments. In Circuit Courtrooms, staff includes the judges, one court reporter, and one clerk/bailiff or law clerk/bailiff.

Court records storage and public transactions with the clerical staff are combined for the District and Circuit Courts in one department and location on the second floor. Located on each side of the central stairs, the clerical spaces are set off from the public lobby by windowed counters which do not extend to the ceilings.

One small court department, the Custody Referees, is located in the jail building just outside its secure perimeter. Custody referees interview newly arrested inmates to determine their eligibility for release on bond or recognizance and for appointment of public defenders. They also receive all bail payments and are open well into the evening. Visitors are interviewed in the interior offices and inmates are interviewed through conventional jail interview booths located in the outer office.

Another court unit, consisting of one judge and personal staff and a small clerical staff is located in the Juvenile Center. They occupy a small portion of the facility, in and around the juvenile courtroom. The courtroom has no telephone and no alarm system.
ANALYSIS

Accessibility

Here is a building which is accessible on, not one, but three floors through doors regularly used by public and staff going to and from offices in the Public Service Building as well as entering the courthouse. Given the number of entrances, their frequent use, and the fire code requirements, it is impractical to think of restricting access to a single point where searches or security observations could be made, if that should become necessary.

Private Elevator

The single private elevator does triple duty for freight, staff, and prisoners, which is efficient, but staff and prisoner trips are not separated, which is inappropriate. Staff—including judges—and jurors waiting for that elevator have no way of knowing whether it is being used to move prisoners, including some who might have been in their courtrooms.

Private Corridors

Leading directly to the judges’ chambers and jury deliberation rooms are the “back halls”, which were designed to be private but in practice are accessible to anyone through the unlocked doors to the public corridors. Although the corridors are open to surveillance by the secretarial and clerical staffs, only an egregiously offensive visitor is likely to attract attention. Judges and juries should be afforded privacy, to assure the public of the propriety of their deliberations and to protect their personal safety.

Courtrooms

Courtroom security is important because courtrooms are the foci for the unplanned emotional and medical, as well as the premeditated, situations that come under the heading of security. Interior design and the use of security personnel are the two major factors that determine the security of courtrooms.

Domestic relations proceedings usually are the most violence-prone courtroom activities in any jurisdiction because of the extreme emotions of the parties, and it is during such proceedings that most shootings and assaults have taken place (as in Multnomah County ten
years ago, etc., etc.). Domestic Relations courtrooms should be designed to minimize opportunities for confrontations between the parties, and courtroom procedures should be arranged to restrict their movements and keep them well apart. Designs which minimize security problems are most effective in courtrooms specified for domestic relations proceedings, rather than the more general purposes which are the pattern in Lane County.

Courtrooms where large dockets are scheduled, typically for traffic causes, and in which spectator seating capacity is large or exceeded, should have security officers present to keep the proceedings orderly and the participants moving properly. In these courtrooms the large volume of short-duration cases usually involve many first-time defendants and witnesses, and can easily amplify confusion and foster disrespect for the institutions.

Medical emergencies involving persons in courtrooms are as likely as in any similar group. Quick access to trained emergency medical help (EMT or others) is important. Telephones should be close at hand in courtrooms, and medical emergency procedures should be regularized and made familiar to courtroom personnel.

Records Storage

Although the courthouse is open and accessible for many hours before and after the court working day, the records storage spaces are not secure because they are not enclosed. All active case records are filed there and could be compromised by accident or on purpose. During the working day, staff are somewhat too easy to reach because the arrangement, although it has much else to recommend it, appears to be too informal on its public face.

Security Personnel

No regular presence of authority is maintained in the courthouse to which its occupants and the public might look for security. Deputy Sheriffs from the Transport unit provide a security patrol when their other duties permit, but it is occasional, not regular.
Custody Referees

A source of concern to the staff of the Custody Referees office is the ready public accessibility of its space, particularly at night, and the lack of observation from the jail control room. Bail payments are made in cash which is stored in a small safe/strongbox in the interview office until it can be banked. The two booths for interviewing detainees are located in the outer, public, waiting room where a partial measure of privacy, visual, but not sound, has been provided by retrofitted half-doors.

Juvenile Court

In the Juvenile Courtroom, the lack of elementary security provisions is alarming (no pun intended). The courtroom interior cannot be viewed from the staff or public corridors and, to this observer, at least, is oppressive in its color, lighting, and finishes. Juveniles are characteristically less mature emotionally than most other defendants and less-well able to control themselves, although their physical strength may be quite high. The potential for acting out violently is there and should be recognized by providing a communications/alarm capability.

Alarms and Communications

The alarm equipment as installed omits or is inadequate in several locations. Courtrooms have alarm buttons but no telephones. The Jury Assembly Room has a telephone but no alarm. The District Attorney's reception desk has an alarm which only sounds locally, to alert the DA's Investigators, and is not connected to the Sheriff's Department. In the Sheriff's Department, the alarms activate at the dispatch position, but knowledge of the nature of the emergency, or false alarm, must be sought independently of the alarm equipment, usually by telephone.

NON-FACILITY ISSUES

DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

Disturbances

Many comments by court personnel indicate that disturbances in spaces other than courtrooms are too common. In addition to hallway tussles between contestants whose
problems were not solved to their mutual satisfaction in the courtrooms, there are disturbances by persons who bring individual problems to the courthouse for relief of some sort. Many of these involve individuals, well-known to courthouse staff, who are regular and emotionally unstable visitors, and who have to be brought under some sort of physical control. These disturbances seem to center in the District Attorney's office on the fourth floor and all of the back halls to the judges' chambers.

**Security Training**

Expressions by courthouse occupants were widespread about the need for and acceptance of security policies, procedures, and training. Although an emergency bomb threat plan was prepared some years ago, it is no longer widely known to occupants, is not exercised, and probably could not be implemented because of the general unfamiliarity. What the occupants seem to want is a simple but comprehensive security policy, including training and a manual, giving some rules and procedures for them to follow—what constitutes a security emergency, what to look for in the way of out-of-the-ordinary behavior by visitors, whom to notify of a potential problem, in what circumstances and when to notify, and what to do until help arrives—and periodic drills to familiarize everyone with the procedures.

**Atmosphere**

Agreement was clear and general that a fortress atmosphere was neither desirable nor necessary. Some of the influences on the security and safety of other court facilities—gang threats, overcrowding, and lack of respect for the laws—have not been significantly felt in Eugene, although there is a strong suspicion that unauthorized weapons are being brought into the building. Without such pressures to generate stronger preventive measures, it is pointless to discuss instituting personal and package searches or limiting public access to the building. Several people mentioned the U.S. Courthouse in Eugene where weapons detection and package search stations are located at the public door. Although none objected to participating in those measures, very few thought they would be necessary in the county courthouse.

**Security Personnel**

Here is the nub of this and all court security analyses, security personnel: How many? What organizational status? What cost? Personnel are necessary, but technology and architectural
design can reduce their number and trade one-time costs for ongoing costs. The Lane County Courthouse has some desirable architectural security features and can readily accept some simple technology to better exploit them, but it is seriously deficient in the number of personnel dedicated to court security duties; there are none.

There is general praise for the quality of the deputies assigned to transport duties, to the way they handle prisoner custody, and to how they augment their prisoner escort duties with courthouse patrols when time permits. As many as 100 circuit court in-custody arrangements have been held in one session with up to about 30 prisoners in the arraignment courtroom at one time. Clearly, deputies can only occasionally be available for courtroom security duties or for performing regular courthouse patrols. Security is being stretched thin both by the lack of dedicated court security officers and of technology which could be used to minimize the necessary number of such officers.

**Schedules and Procedures**

With the limited number of transport deputies, seven in the unit, and the large number of courts, fifteen currently, the scheduling of deputies’ time is particularly important in determining their availability to perform additional security duties. Three points would have significant impact: 1) scheduling all arraignments to the two courtrooms closest to the prisoner/private elevator, 2) scheduling courtroom caseflows to minimize the length of time that prisoners (and deputies) must remain in the courtrooms, and 3) including the availability of deputies among the factors that are used to determine the calendar dates for certain cases with high security or custody demands.

**Video Arraignment**

One of the technological improvements for courthouse security coming into increasing use throughout the country is video arraignment; closed circuit television links set up between the courthouse and the jail to facilitate arraignments without transporting detainees back and forth between the two buildings. The movement towards establishing a video arraignment capability is well under way in Lane County and is strongly endorsed by this author. Beyond the obvious security advantages coincident with maintaining inmates in custody within the security of the jail, several other benefits should follow. Rather than fully examining them in this report, reference is invited to a report already forwarded to Norman Meyer, "Technical Assistance to Yellowstone County, Montana; T.A. Project No. 151" and to these few points.
The number of transport deputies should remain undiminished so that they can increase the amount of time they can spend on court security duties. Methods for maximizing the use of the video system should be studied (e.g.: attorney/client interviews, procedural and calendar calls, defendants who might need restraints, simple pleas and sentencings, other special circumstances).
RECOMMENDATIONS

Behind the following recommendations is a way of dealing with security design in reference to three types of measures: architectural, technological, and personnel. These are not, in fact, separable measures except analytically, a security officer with a walkie-talkie radio escorting a prisoner through a secure corridor combines the three, but the value of considering security measures according to these three categories is that costs (both short-term and long-term) can be more explicitly considered. For example, architectural security measures (e.g. three separate circulation systems for public, private, and secure use) often are expensive to install, especially to retrofit, but their long-term costs are small compared to personnel costs for similar levels of security.

In developing these recommendations, my approach was to pick measures which seem appropriate both to the security situations I observed and those I believe to be likely in the Lane County Courthouse, and to the financial resources of county government. It must be pointed out that we are dealing, here, with future possibilities, attempting to deter problems that are likely whether or not they have so far resulted in notorious incidents. The types of measures discussed below are included because of their cost-effectiveness in giving significant advantages at minimal costs. They have been picked because they can 1) help deter problems, 2) detect problems when they do occur, and 3) limit the costs and damages of security incidents.

The recommendations are presented in the form of brief descriptions with priority and comparative cost estimates, where appropriate. Overall, the thrust of these comments is to maximize the effectiveness of the scarcest security resources: personnel and finances. Some tradeoffs are involved with customary courtroom or casework management procedures, but these are recommended in order to derive the security benefits and should represent tolerable administrative changes.

FACILITY ISSUES

Private Corridors

All doors to each of the back halls should be kept closed and locked to make the halls, in fact as well as in name, private corridors. Rather than conventional keys which introduce insurmountable problems of key control, the locks should be converted to use computer-
controlled card-keys and be operated within the existing Honeywell Delta 1000 system, if feasible, or in a new system. Several building access doors already use this system. An intercom for requesting admittance also can be installed at each door. Electrical door-opening controls can be installed at one or two locations within each private corridor to simplify admitting persons who don’t hold card-keys.

Card-keys should be issued only to those staff members who require access to the back halls. Others can request admittance using the intercoms or the existing telephones and be escorted or buzzed in. The usual system capabilities for locking-out lost or other designated cards should be implemented.

The purpose of the system is not to make it difficult for authorized persons to move around the courthouse but to keep unauthorized persons out of the private corridors and the offices to which they lead. Card-keys should be issued and controlled with that purpose in mind. The means of using the proposed system should be studied in detail as a prelude to its installation.

**Private Elevator**

It is my estimate that a keyed control system exists for the private elevator which would permit it to be controlled by deputies while transporting prisoners so that it will not answer calls until returned to general use. If so, an operating manual should be prepared and appropriate keys should be obtained. If not, such a capability should be added to the elevator control system. In either event, signals should be installed at each floor to indicate when the elevator is not available for general use.

**Courtrooms**

A serious effort should be made to schedule all arraignments either in District Courtroom 1 for both courts or there for District Court and in Circuit Courtroom 1 for Circuit Court. This involves some changes in how cases, courtrooms, and judges are assigned. For example, 1) cases might be reassigned from the arraignment courtrooms to vacated courtrooms, 2) calendars for the judges resident in the arraignment courtrooms could be rearranged around the duration of arraignments, or 3) judges handling arraignments could exchange their courtrooms for the arraignment courtroom for the period of that assignment.
Using just these courtrooms, which are the closest to the private elevator, will minimize the need to move prisoners through the private or public corridors. It will also minimize the time needed to move prisoners between the Sheriff’s holding cells and the arraignment courtrooms which may speed up the arraignment process. (A more effective solution would be to institute video arraignments as described elsewhere in the report.)

The practice of hearing Domestic Relations cases in general purpose courtrooms has always seemed to me to be capable of improvement. My preferred recommendation is to pick one or several small courtrooms for this purpose and rearrange the furniture to ameliorate, to some degree, the stresses that sometimes push litigants to violence. To plan such changes, the movements and seating of litigants and witnesses should be redirected as necessary to keep opposing parties separated. Attorneys should be invited to participate in the planning and to buy into the idea that they should exercise some leadership in seeing that their clients are not left alone with each other, in or out of a courtroom, and are kept at some effective distance from each other. It would be desirable to have and use separate waiting/conference rooms, rather than the common corridor, for domestic litigants. Separating the counsel tables (remember, there are no juries in these cases) and seating the litigants at opposite ends would be a good start, and directing the litigants and witnesses to move to and from the witness stand without getting close to each other would also be useful.

Each courtroom should have a telephone at the bench or clerk's station. A good time for installation would be while the courtrooms are being wired for computers. The cumulative cost of time wasted by sending someone out for information or documents, rather than calling for assistance, will be reduced and will offset installation costs over a period of time.

The courtroom alarm actuator (duress button) should be upgraded, regularly tested, and made to include in the signal information about the nature of the emergency or false alarm. One possibility is to integrate the alarm with the telephone system so that the phone line carries both the alarm signal and the information. Some systems of this type use dedicated lines to connect the courtrooms with the Sheriff’s dispatcher, opening the circuit when the duress button is actuated. Other systems may interface with the intercom network by automatically dialing the dispatcher when the duress button is activated.
Other Alarm Circuits

In addition to the courtrooms, the alarm system should include all locations where problems can be anticipated, including the various public windows in the records rooms, the District Attorney’s Office, the Jury Assembly Room, Juvenile Court courtroom and judge’s chambers, and all chambers. The system should be designed to indicate visually and audibly the location of the emergency and the nature of the emergency and should continue to transmit to the Sheriff’s Dispatcher and, in Juvenile Court, to a location in the Juvenile Detention Center, as described below.

Records Storage

To secure the court records, which are vital to the judicial process, the records storage spaces should be fully enclosed. An effective approach would be to extend and fasten the counter structures to the deck overhead. It might be necessary to adjust the position of the west side counters backwards a foot or so. All counter openings should be closed and locked after hours. Lockable doors to the public corridor should be installed, and the side door of the District Court records room, which opens near the Information Booth, should be kept locked at all times. Each counter position should have a duress button tied into the new alarm system.

Juvenile Court

Although the courtroom would best be redesigned to improve its lack of visibility and oppressive atmosphere, at least it must be provided with a telephone and also be connected to the alarm system. Because the Sheriff’s dispatcher is relatively distant in terms of response time, the alarm also should signal in the Juvenile Detention Center at a location which always is manned and from which immediate help can be sent.

Equally important, no proceeding in which a juvenile is present should be held in the courtroom without a capable detention officer or other security officer present for security purposes. Because juvenile proceedings are the most dangerous in the court system, this is a precaution which must be taken.
Custody Referees

Improving security for the Custody Referees will require redesign of the space to separate the referees from their clients. Perhaps the simplest approach is to build a new anteroom outside the existing exterior door and replace that door with a secure combination door/counter. The half-doors on the interview booths will then not be needed and could be replaced by a privacy screen to shield the booths from the new counter. All public transactions should take place at the new counter which could be fitted with a gentle signal to call the staff.

This modification will permit only one interview to take place at a time. Alternatively, if an interview window is constructed on either side of the existing door, two simultaneous interviews could be handled.

NON-FACILITY ISSUES

Security Personnel

Appropriate courthouse security depends ultimately on the number and quality of security personnel on duty. In addition to prisoner custody, security duties include maintaining order in courtrooms and throughout the building, responding to emergencies whenever and wherever they develop, and conducting any regular or special security procedures (e.g., weapons searches) that are judged necessary.

The only dependable source of court security personnel is a staff composed of persons who are specifically trained for the purpose and who are permanently assigned. Often these duties are provided by the jurisdiction's Sheriff's Department, according to ancient tradition derived from British history, whence also comes our tradition of common law, but in some courts they are provided by such other agencies as marshals, bailiffs, or court officers. Usually the personnel are sworn officers, often they are employed directly by the courts they serve. The service is financed, depending on applicable state and local laws, out of state funds (as in Virginia where sheriff's deputies are indirectly carried on the state payroll), county funds, or court funds.

Some innovative approaches to court financing are appearing. A number of counties in the state of Illinois make use of a special security fund to hire and train court security officers who
are used to supplement a small core of sheriff’s deputies. The procedure and purposes of one recommended application of this fund are quite relevant to Lane County and are summarized in the following excerpt from the report of TA Project 140, Kane County, Illinois. In this excerpt:

"'Bluecoats' is the name used to identify the security personnel employed by the court, currently three in number—two in Family Court and one in Circuit Court—who dress in blue blazers (with county sheriff patches), carry arms, and are trained in security duties. They are distinguished from the nine "Redcoats", who serve in the County Courthouse as court bailiffs, are used to escort juries, and are without security duties or training.

SECURITY PERSONNEL

Additional Personnel

The most pressing security need is for additional security personnel. The preferable level is to provide one security officer in each courtroom, others to maintain custody of prisoners and escort them through the buildings, and others to staff security stations such as weapons detectors and be available to respond to emergencies in the buildings if and where they occur. These must be men and women trained in court security, general law enforcement procedures, weapons, first aid, and in the specific duties of their duty stations. The Kane County court (and other Illinois courts) has a mechanism available for at least beginning to bring about an increase in the number of quality personnel, the court security fund.

The security fund is authorized by the legislature and is collected by court order in each county. In Kane County it is collected from a $5 fee on all filings and on all criminal fines and costs. The fee is deducted before funds are credited to the municipalities. Monthly collections, since June 1987, when the security fund began, have been about $21,500.

Bluecoats are now paid (from the security fund) at an annualized rate of $16,600, plus sick pay and are responsible to the Sheriff. Redcoats are paid from county funds (not from the security fund) at an annual rate of about
$12,000 and are responsible to the court.

Funding

The rate of accrual of the security fund would provide for a total security force considerably larger than today's three Bluecoats. At a pay scale closer to that of Deputy Sheriffs than the current $16,600, a staff of at least eight would be a good a start, hired as the security fund is realized and increasing from there as experience warrants.

One approach to optimizing the use of funds is to gradually absorb the Redcoat function into the Bluecoat staff, adding the available Redcoat funding to that obtained from the security fund, and thus placing security officers in each courtroom. The pay exchange would provide about five Bluecoats.

Staff Size

A total of thirteen (eight plus five) security officers could be obtained while still leaving funds for the purchase of security equipment. This could leave two security officers in Family Court (even after Juvenile Court moves to the County Courthouse) in addition to two Deputy Sheriffs and place eleven security officers in Circuit Court. With one security officer in charge, this would allow ten to be assigned duty stations in the courthouse, including door control stations, prisoner escort, and, quite significantly, courtroom duty.

Training and operational responsibility should remain with the Sheriff, but assignments should be made in coordination with the Court Administrator."

The comments excerpted above are largely transferable to Lane County, except for the titles and dollar figures cited, and are recommended as a starting point for study. Note that the Illinois security fund is authorized by the legislature and collected by court order in the counties. A number of special purpose assessments already are collected in the Lane County courts, so the precedent for a court security fund appears to have been set.
**Video Arraignment**

Video arraignments and their security and other impacts have been mentioned elsewhere in this report and relevant technical information already has been forwarded to Norman Meyer. A video arraignment system should be designed and installed and should be given sufficient adaptability to other uses to allow the system to be thoroughly exploited as experience develops with its potential.

The Open Visiting Area in the Lane County Jail has been proposed as the location for the jail studio. It currently is used for Municipal Court arraignments. The room itself appears satisfactory and its adjacent holding cells, elevator, booking, and large lobby should make for a practical and manageable process.

Natural light and overhead directional fixtures should provide effective television lighting. The room is more than adequate in area for as many prisoners as the department would likely desire to have in the room at any one time. The single column in the center of the room does not present a problem to sitting camera or prisoners. Visibility of the room's TV monitor(s) by defendants being arraigned should be good, but the defendant-monitor sightline should be laid out to avoid glare from the windows. The location of the room within the secure perimeter of the jail also should enhance the utility of the video system for other interviews.

Considerations concerning the courthouse studio are discussed in the TA report referenced above. For cost control, normally only one courthouse studio is set up, sometimes in a courtroom and sometimes in a smaller room which can be optimized as a studio and used for arraignments and other interviews without conflicting with courtroom schedules. In either event, the use of video arraignments gives better security than transporting in-custody defendants to the courthouse for arraignment.

**Security Procedures, Rules, and Signs**

A security policy should be developed and presented to the entire courthouse staff in the form of a simple manual and periodic training sessions and emergency drills. The manual should clearly set out what kinds of behavior are unacceptable in the courts' clientele, describe what the staff should look for in trying to identify potential problems, and establish procedures about whom to notify, when, by what means, and what response to expect.
Included in the training should be regular emergency procedures such as fire and other evacuation drills as well as other safety and security situations such as have been mentioned in this report. If one of the court managers observes someone who, as described in the manual, seems to be behaving in a suspicious way or carrying an unusual package, she or he should know how to report the situation and what to do while waiting for a response.

Many courts have established rules explicitly forbidding weapons from being carried into their facilities and authorizing personal searches to be carried out. They have posted signs in their facilities notifying everyone of those rules. It is a simple step, but it does make people think twice about bringing weapons into courthouses. But if such steps are taken, they must be implemented to establish the seriousness of the courts' intent to keep the facilities free of unauthorized weapons.

**Security Committee**

The Security Committee should become a standing committee, meet at regular intervals, and accept two major responsibilities:

- assigning responsibility for preparing the security procedures and manual
- reviewing security and recommending policies to keep security at a desirable level.

Court security implementations depend on statutory authority, inherent court powers, and the availability of finance, so the last word comes, in fact, from diverse sources with overlapping interests. A security committee, whose membership includes all departments with a security role, can provide a useful forum for identifying those interests and establishing their common areas. In Lane County, the security committee already has done useful work and should be encouraged to continue. It should meet regularly, but not so frequently that attendance becomes onerous, and it should try to develop a consensus about the existence of security problems and agreement about feasible solutions.

**Time Priorities and Comparative Costs**

The recommendations outlined above can be assigned relative time priorities and will involve a range of costs. To present an estimate of these factors, the following table is organized according to the headings used above, some of which, "Courtrooms", for example, include
more than one security measure.

Time priorities are expressed in two categories, immediate (I) and near-term (N). The have been estimated in reference to the degree of improvement they would bring about, the degree of need for them, and the ease of accomplishing them.

Comparative cost levels have been expressed in two categories, as highest (H), median (M), and least (L).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>PRIORITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Corridors</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>L</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<tr>
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is a pleasure to state my appreciation to the people who met with me and discussed at length their views about security in the Lane County Courthouse.

Trial Court Administrator
   Norman H. Meyer, Jr.

Circuit Court Judges
   Pierre Van Rysselbergh
   Gregory G. Foote
   Judge Hargreaves

District Court Judges
   Kip W. Leonard
   Bryan T. Hodges

District Attorney's Office
   Douglas Harderode, D.A
   James Sharp, Investigator

Lane County Administration
   Margo Drivas
   David Gamick

Sheriff's Department
   Lieut. John Clague
   Sergeant E.R. Woodworth

Court Manager and Supervisors
   (En Banc)

Custody Referees
   (En Banc)

Lane County Building Maintenance
   Jack Miller