REVIEW OF FACILITY SECURITY NEEDS OF
THE EL PASO COUNTY JUDICIAL BUILDING
4TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF COLORADO

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT

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REVIEW OF FACILITY SECURITY NEEDS OF
THE EL PASO COUNTY JUDICIAL BUILDING
4TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF COLORADO

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I. INTRODUCTION

The central question of court security, for which each court seeks its own answer, is to strike an appropriate balance between two conflicting demands: providing for the security of the public and the personnel of the court while keeping court facilities and court proceedings open to that public.

That question is now being addressed in Colorado Springs, Colorado, by El Paso County’s County and District Courts, Sheriff’s Department, and County Commissioners. They all share responsibilities and interests in keeping their Judicial Building safe, in ensuring the custody of prisoners, and in maintaining the administration of justice. They all share in the need to conduct their operations in accordance with their budgets. And they all are aware that there are methods, especially technological ones, which could be applied to increase court security.

This study was undertaken in response to a technical assistance request in September, 1987, from Judge Douglas Anderson (then a County Court Judge, now a District Court Judge) who served as the County Court representative on a County Security Committee created to study the courthouse facility security issue. Judge Anderson’s request for consultative assistance to the Committee was directed to the National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada, and was referred to EMT’s BJA-funded Adjudication Technical Assistance Project (ATAP) by the College pursuant to an existing cooperative agreement between that institution and the project.

Following discussions by phone with Judge Anderson about his request and the solicitation of additional information, including courthouse floor plans and Committee reports for pre-site work review, the project selected Mr. Lawrence Seigel to provide the necessary review. Mr. Seigel is a private consultant specializing in court facilities, who has extensive national experience in court facility space and security planning on both a direct contract basis and under LEAA and BJA technical assistance programs. He is the author of an ATAP technical assistance monograph entitled, "The Image of Justice: People, Space and Function in the American Courthouse." After reviewing the background materials on the assignment and arranging his interview schedule by phone with Judge Anderson, Mr. Seigel travelled to Colorado Springs, Colorado (the El Paso County seat) in mid-October for a three-day site visit.

El Paso County officials addressing the courthouse security issue face two challenges: how much security is enough, and what specific measures should they employ to reach that level?
This study was undertaken to help them successfully respond to those challenges by considering each in turn, deriving some reference points from the experiences of other jurisdictions, and suggesting certain measures that appear to be appropriate in the light of those experiences. This report is governed by the purposes of the Adjudication Technical Assistance Project to provide information which will also serve other courts undertaking an assessment of their own courthouse security needs. As a consequence, it is broad enough in focus to highlight the more universal aspects of courthouse security, and contains, as Section II, a brief discussion of the general problems of court security that are likely to be found in any facility and system. Section III then describes the El Paso County Judicial Building and its security operations followed by Section IV which reviews the main security concerns there which were addressed by this project. Section V summarizes the specific recommendations.
II. DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF COURT SECURITY

In order to define the concept of courthouse security and establish some terminology, we first must answer this question—how can we measure security?

Security in a courthouse certainly can be described by its qualitative perception; we feel secure or we feel insecure, depending on whether we sense any personal danger. But one person’s perception of security is not a tangible measure of the adequacy of security provisions and probably depends very strongly on that person’s familiarity with the situations in courthouses. A good starting point for studying court security is to describe the security situations—the most likely places and times for security problems to occur.

A. Security Situations

Those situations that typically involve elements of security are predictable. They relate to the persons who are in courthouses and to the reasons they are there.

All court cases are contests and have losers. Some losers become upset, lose emotional control, and act out their frustrations against anyone. When such acts include physical violence or the use of a weapon they are security threats. The most prevalent and dangerous of these situations are in domestic relations cases, where altercations and shootings are all too common.

Judges, jurors, and witnesses in any case are subject to pressures from interested parties who have something to lose or gain. Any of these pressures which take the form of outright attempts at intimidation are considered to be security threats.

Defendants in criminal cases are deprived of their freedom when they fail to post bond or are sentenced. These are moments of tension when the urge and opportunity to escape are both high.

Many criminal trials involve on one side persons charged with violent crimes, and on the other victims who have suffered physical, emotional, and financial harm. Questions of courthouse security concern several possibilities: that defendants may become violent, that victims may threaten the security of other persons, and that detained defendants may try to escape from custody.

Juvenile cases bring to the courthouse young males and females whose physical strength may exceed their emotional maturity, who are accused of violent acts, or who face long periods of detention. Juvenile courts usually are found to be security stress points for just these reasons.

Courthouse records contain information that may be of considerable value if it can
be withheld, delayed, altered, or destroyed. Cash and objects of value, which are kept (even briefly) in cashiers' offices, are potential targets for theft. Persons paying fines often are disgruntled and may use the occasion for some outburst or violence.

B. The Security System

Security measures fall into three broad categories--architectural, technological, and operational--which interact to form a security system. We are concerned with their interactions (that is, whether or not, and at what comparative cost, measures can substitute for each other), their effects on other courthouse processes, and their propriety.

Courthouse security encompasses deterrence, detection, and limitation of damage. An effective court security system design would aim to deter potential threats to the safety of the persons and facilities of the court. The more effective the deterrence, the lower the incidence of security problems. Where deterrence fails--and it may, at least in the face of persons intent on causing trouble--a court security system should detect threats rapidly and alert those who can take appropriate action. Finally, a court security system should limit the damage that might be caused by threats which turn into reality.

Although the idea of a fully secure courthouse might call to mind a kind of fortress, bristling with armed guards and all but inaccessible to the public, that theme is both inappropriate and impractical. It is inappropriate to the courthouse as the place where justice is dispensed freely and openly and as the repository of public records. It is impractical except for very limited periods of time during instances of credible major security threats.

In the early 1970's, several jurisdictions found such threats amid the turmoil of domestic reaction to the Vietnam war and aggressive civil rights activities. Currently, some western states are finding threats from the other side of the political spectrum. Typically, courts have responded by increasing security staffs and operations and installing technological measures (e.g., weapons detectors) during the period of most intense concern. But, given the luxury of a choice of starting point for security design, these responses turn out to be less cost-effective over the long-term than the introduction of better architectural security designs in new court facilities. Long-term security upgrades that combine increases in security staffing with improved technology remain important, however, in existing court facilities where significant architectural improvements may not be feasible.

The cost of long-term effective courthouse security is comprised of two elements:
the cost of initial facility design and construction and the cost of maintaining security operations. They trade off against each other, with the cumulative costs of personnel becoming dominant relatively soon. To improve the tradeoff for a time and make more effective use of a given number of personnel, security equipment can be deployed, especially from the technologies of detection, communications, and alarms. In an existing courthouse, security improvements generally hinge on finding a cost-effective combination of operational procedures and security equipment which is appropriate to the underlying purposes of the justice system.

C. Analysis

We know the dangers of these situations; we try to anticipate when and where they might occur; and we act to prevent them. If the preventive measures are successful, we consider security to be good, but if the threats don't materialize, it may be difficult to determine if successful security measures deterred them or if they just didn't happen. In short, poor security can be measured by the number and seriousness of incidents that do occur, but "perfect" security can't be measured that way. But we know that in the long run, the underlying facts must hold true: the circumstances in which security situations occur will give rise to problems unless we operate a security system which is adequate to prevent or contain them.

We can analyze courthouse security in its comprehensive context by looking at security measures and problems in a systematic way. The following sections of this report examine the El Paso County court security problem in that way and recommend improvements which are consistent with the nature of the problems, the costs of instituting improved security, and the propriety of the results.
III. THE EL PASO COUNTY JUDICIAL BUILDING AND ITS SECURITY OPERATIONS

The Colorado trial court system includes a County Court and a District Court, each with civil and criminal jurisdiction, the County Court's limited and the District Court's general. Criminal proceedings commence with "advisements" in the County Court: administrative proceedings to advise all defendants (in and out of custody) of their rights, the nature of the charges against them and the range of penalties, and to make preliminary reviews of bond and appointments of public defenders. These take place in one courtroom at 2 PM and can involve as many as 30 defendants in custody. Juvenile and probate cases are heard in small hearing rooms by commissioners, and domestic relations cases are heard in a courtroom by a referee.

A. The Courthouse Description

Location

The courthouse (more formally the El Paso County Judicial Building) is the center of a complex of county government facilities in downtown Colorado Springs. It lies between the county jail (across a broad plaza) and the county administration building (across Vermijo Street). The jail is about to be augmented by a new facility at a remote location. Across the street at the east end of the plaza is the old county courthouse (now a museum), and across the street at the west end is the imposing Pike's Peak Center and a new county administrative annex, the Centennial Hall.

Size

Each floor of the large five-story courthouse (the fifth floor is unfinished and awaits future use) contains about 39,000 sq. ft. gross. The building, which measures about 122 feet wide and 320 feet long on the interior, also contains a basement with storage, mechanical, and service spaces and a small sub-basement with holding cells and a tunnel to the jail.

Plan

The floor plan is not unusual (see Figures 1 and 2). It shows the elevator and service core in the center, where it separates the building into left and right halves and
connects two (doubly-loaded) corridors which run the length of the building, the front public corridor and the rear "back hall".

On the second, third, and fourth floors a row of courthoms is located to each side of the elevator lobby, between the front public corridor and the nominally private "back hall" which also leads to the judges' chambers and jury rooms. Off the front corridor, opposite the public entrances to the courtrooms, are offices of court-related agencies, including the adult and juvenile probation departments, the Public Trustee, several suites of hearing rooms for juvenile and probate matters, and an office for personal recognizance bond applications, as well as witness waiting rooms and other spaces. The first floor houses the clerks' offices and a traffic courtroom.

Public Access

Four sets of public doors are located on the first floor, one set at each end and one set on each side at the center of the building. They provide public access from the plaza (and the jail) and from three streets. Access to the back hall, and from there to the judges' chambers, jury rooms, and the private doors of each courtroom, is not restricted or controlled as a matter of policy. Dockets are set in the judges' chambers, rather than in a central office, by attorneys meeting with judges' and their secretaries. Back hall traffic of jurors, attorneys, escorted prisoners, court personnel, related agency personnel, wedding parties, and others (including the occasional consultant) is fairly constant throughout the day.

B. Security Facilities

The spaces used for security include holding cells on the floors and one security elevator connecting the sub-basement with each floor.

Holding Cells

The main holding facility is in the sub-basement, connected to the jail by a tunnel. Each courtroom floor (2, 3, and 4) contains a set of holding cells on either wing of the back hall and another central sally port/cell at the elevator. All cells open onto the back hall. The first floor has only the central holding cell, now used solely for juveniles.
Prisoner Movement

Vertical transportation between the sub-basement and the other floors is provided by a secure elevator in the central core, opening through the central sally port/holding cell to the back hall of courtroom floors. Prisoners are escorted by deputy sheriffs through the back hall from the elevator to the holding cells and to courtrooms. Prisoners are individually handcuffed during transport and also in courtrooms, except during hearings and jury trials.

A new jail is nearing completion at a location remote from the courthouse. When it is in operation, prisoners being transported between it and the courthouse will first be moved to the current jail by vehicles and then through the jail/courthouse tunnel on foot, as at present.

Emergency Alarms

Each courtroom contains an alarm button on the judge's bench which turns on a light at the courtroom door and also on a display panel, both in the back hall. The system can be used for medical emergencies as well as security emergencies but, because of the location of the display panel, is not monitored to a degree that is satisfactory to the Sheriff's Department.

C. Security Responsibilities and Operations

Responsibilities

Responsibilities for security in the courthouse are divided. The Sheriff's Department is responsible for the custody of prisoners, wherever located, but is not formally responsible for other security functions in the courthouse. Informally, however, the courthouse unit exercises some other security responsibilities by responding to courtroom emergency alarms and, in a more general sense, by its deputies' presence in the private and public areas of the courthouse.

No other agency is directly responsible for courthouse security during working hours. After hours, building security is provided by the county's Security Department, which also is responsible for all the other county buildings and property. During business hours, it normally has no personnel in the building.

The County Court has staff positions known as Bailiffs, but these are not security personnel; they fill the same functions as Law Clerks in the District Court.
**Personnel**

The courthouse deputy sheriffs have a small office on the third floor back hall. Their current complement totals eighteen, including a sergeant, in command, and their duties include maintaining custody of prisoners in the courthouse, moving prisoners between the courthouse and jail, and transporting prisoners throughout the state, to and from state institutions and other counties. With the opening of the new jail, this staff will be increased to handle the additional court/jail transportation responsibilities.

**Weapons**

Courthouse deputies carry arms except in the jail, itself. Uniformed officers of the Colorado Springs Police Department are not permitted to carry arms in courtrooms and must check them in their liaison office on the second floor, back hall.

**Operations**

Within courtrooms in which they are present, Sheriff's Deputies in fact provide overall courtroom security and appear to be well-trained and familiar with their responsibilities and with the range of courtroom situations that may involve security considerations. Elsewhere in the courthouse, they respond to emergencies of which they are made aware and provide crowd control and operate weapons detectors at specific locations on request.
IV. SECURITY QUESTIONS IN THE JUDICIAL BUILDING

The major security concerns can be paraphrased as follows:

1. Preventing unauthorized weapons from being brought into the courthouse.
2. Improving the emergency alarm system to provide faster and more precise information about the nature and location of emergencies.
3. Institutionalizing the existing informal docket controls to make best the use of available security personnel and resources.
4. Deciding on an appropriate composition and size of a court security staff.

We will look at them one at a time and then combine them in a set of recommendations for consideration by the El Paso County Court, Sheriff, and Commissioners.

A. Preventing Unauthorized Weapons From Being Brought Into the Courthouse

In El Paso County, the normal concern about persons bringing concealed weapons into the courthouse has been heightened by a number of recent incidents in Colorado and elsewhere that have prompted a secondary focus on more directed and specific threats from organizations with drug trafficking, terrorist, and other disruptive agendas.

Fundamentally, unauthorized weapons can be detected by searching persons and packages coming in to the courthouse. Persons can be searched directly by security officers or indirectly by officers operating hand-held or walk-through weapons detectors. Either probably requires a court order.

Searches can be carried out at any convenient place but usually are organized either at the courthouse door or at the door of a particular courtroom. (While searches at a courtroom door don't directly prevent weapons from being brought into a courthouse, they probably are strong deterrents).

Packages can be opened and searched visually by security officers or examined without opening by officers using x-ray and weapons detection equipment. Package searches normally would be carried out in tandem with personal searches and under the same rules.

If weapons searches are to be made, the choices are of method, location, and timing. Equipment can be used to speed up the process but not to significantly reduce the number of officers required. Generally, for personal and package searches the
technology is less offensive and faster than frisking.

The choice of location is closely related to the choice of timing. If searches are to be the rule at all times, the practical location is at the courthouse door; but if they are to be made (infrequently) on certain occasions, the practical location may be at the courtroom or other site where the threat is anticipated.

Conducting searches at the courthouse door requires that a station be established at every set of doors or that all access to the facility be controlled to come through one or two locations. In most courthouses, the election of this security method has resulted in all access points being closed except the one best-suited to conducting the searches. In the El Paso County Judicial Building, the best suited location for courthouse door security screening is the corridor between the two central doors.

Weapons searches generally have been found to be effective and are used in large and small court facilities throughout the country, including such large facilities as the Cook County Criminal Court in Chicago, the District of Columbia Superior Court, the Baltimore City Circuit Court, the Marin County (California) Courthouse, the Hall of Justice in San Francisco, and the Prince Georges County (Maryland) Courthouse, and the much smaller Howard County (Maryland) Courthouse. (These are facilities where the consultant has personal knowledge of the installations). Some of these installations were initiated after shootings had occurred in that facility or in other facilities. Each of them included weapons detection equipment. In addition, courtrooms in the City of New York were posted as early as 1971 with signs noting that frisking is authorized, and, in fact, searches have been carried out more or less routinely.

It is noteworthy that the success of any of these installations rests upon the discipline maintained by the security personnel. The San Francisco installation, for example, did not prevent a fatal courthouse shooting in April, 1986.

In the Judicial Building, both sets of end doors lead immediately to stairwells serving the entire building and could not be used for controlled access to a security position in the central lobby. The south doors facing Vermijo Street have the highest use and are, architecturally, the front doors.

The plaza doors, on the north side, are less used. The west end doors are served by a bus stop, but the route from bus stop to elevators is about the same length through the front doors, although it is outdoors and in the weather.

The most effective location for a security station would be in the south lobby, with public access limited to the south doors. Staff access should be provided through another set of doors which should be locked against unauthorized entry and which bypass the
security station. A computer-controlled card-key type of system should be used for the staff doors, rather than conventional keys. All locked doors should be equipped with alarmed crash bars for emergency exiting. These alarms would be monitored by the card-key computer system, which also would keep a log of door use and card-key use and would provide immediate modification and control of authorized card-key numbers.

The door closing mechanisms currently in use are not adequate to reliably close the doors against air pressure differentials and would require modifications.

Should formal search procedures be established to prevent unauthorized weapons from being brought into the courthouse? There is a degree of apprehension among court personnel throughout the country that they are or may be in some danger from weapons being brought into their facilities. It probably is based both on specific security problems in their own courthouses and on the continually mounting criminal caseload, particularly the increase in cases involving members of violence-prone drug-trafficking networks. If formal procedures to detect unauthorized weapons and exclude them from a facility will help to allay those apprehensions and to increase security, then it is difficult to argue against them, provided: 1- that they are effective, 2- that they are operated, both in fact and in perception, for the protection of the public as well as staff, and 3- that they do not have the result of denying or limiting access to persons who are not armed.

B. Improving the Emergency Alarm System

Major improvements in the emergency alarm system are necessary to transmit information about the location and nature of the emergency to a location from which adequate responses can be mounted. Three factors are involved:

- locations of alarm transmitters
- locations of alarm indicators
- information transmitted.

Ideally, alarm transmitters should be located wherever emergencies can be anticipated, particularly in each courtroom and hearing room (preferably at the judge's bench) and at each cashier's location. The number of transmitters should be minimized as a practical method of reducing the number of false alarms. The alarm transmission should identify the location of the transmitter and should contain audio or video information about the nature of the emergency so that the response can be appropriate to the problem.

Alarm indicators should be installed in the location (command center, control room, or dispatch office) where the security personnel who are to respond are stationed. The
indication should be obvious and readily distinguished from audible and visual background "noise". The indication should unequivocally identify the source of the alarm. The indication should clearly identify the general nature of the emergency; is it medical or security, is there violence, is it an escape, are there weapons, etc.?

In other words, it is preferable if the alarm indication contains an audio or video transmission of the actual scene of the emergency, or is in some way coded to contain that information.

Clearly, before deciding where to locate alarm indicators, the decision must be made about which agency will respond to the emergency and which agency is responsible for courthouse security. That subject will be discussed subsequently.

C. Institutionalizing Docket Adjustments

The deputy sheriff in charge of the courthouse staff, Sergeant Larsen, works with the judges to informally and mutually adjust court dockets and sheriff's personnel schedules. This allows the deputies to carry out their other duties, primarily transportation of prisoners, which occasionally cause temporary courthouse staff shortages. The procedure appears to work well, but it is quite informal and might not survive personnel changes unless it was institutionalized and made a recognized part of court procedures.

There are inherent difficulties in meshing the assignment of 18 deputy sheriffs to 23 judicial officers (county judges, district judges, and referees) while maintaining courthouse custody of prisoners and providing prisoner transportation throughout the state. They are being handled well but specific procedures should be formalized to the extent that it will not be necessary to rely only on the good personal relationships between the Sergeant and the judges.

D. Court Security Staff

Given the information presented earlier about security responsibilities in the courthouse, instituting weapons detection procedures at the entrance would require additional personnel beyond those currently employed by the county. The county's Security Department has proposed to take on those positions and responsibilities and has worked out staffing plans and assignments. It would not be appropriate for a consultant to comment on the choice of an agency for this assignment, particularly because there is no other claimant, but the budget is of obvious concern to county government.

Don Johnson, Chief of county security, has proposed a staff increase of five
officers over the 13 already on staff in order to handle the weapons detectors and related security duties on a five-day, ten-hour schedule. Of these, three would man the detection equipment, one would respond to emergencies, and one would cover special needs and absences as assigned, perhaps also handling non-courthouse duties as well.

This number seems appropriate to the proposed hours and days of use and the accompanying duties, with the following provisions: the daily work schedule of those security officers should include additional security functions in the courthouse during those substantial periods when the number of persons entering the facility drops to a casual level. In addition to emergency responses, these duties should include:

- regular patrols of the public areas, including the Clerks' counters;
- attendance in courtrooms and hearing rooms during periods of high security needs such as advisements, security trials, juvenile proceedings, and domestic hearings with anticipated security potentials; and,
- attendance at Public Trustee Sales and other events with large public attendance.

Courtroom security would be enhanced by these available personnel but would still remain essentially a responsibility of the Sheriff's Department. Communications between the two units should be established both organizationally and technologically. Radio equipment should be provided and channels should be assigned to interconnect the two departments. Procedures should be established for cooperative emergency actions, including providing information about emergencies to both departments.

It is recommended that the emergency alarm system be designed to notify several locations, some for response and others for information. The courthouse deputies' office should be the primary location for response and the weapons detection station should be the cooperative location for response.

The Sheriff's dispatch office and the county security command center should receive the alarm signals for information and monitoring. If there are two security agencies operating in the courthouse, it will be vital that they function operationally as a single unit. The procedures for establishing and maintaining cooperation between them must be specified and accepted in advance.
V. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

A. **Emergency Alarm System**

Transmitters should be located in each courtroom, hearing room, and cashier station (and in chambers, if desired). A simple on/off switch will suffice, located where it will be difficult to turn on accidentally. The alarm circuits should be wired to the four locations noted above, sounding an audible alarm, giving a visual alarm, and providing audio transmission from the room in which the switch is located. Audio transmission can either be automatic or switched on by authorized personnel at the indicator locations.

Audio transmission from each courtroom can be provided by a sensitive omni-directional microphone, located where it can pickup all sounds originating in the courtroom. Feasible locations include the top or front surface of the judge's bench or the clerk's table or on the ceiling. Pressure zone microphones would be suitable and are unobtrusive when mounted flat against a surface.

B. **Weapons Detection Stations**

A magnetometer-based detection station should be installed at the south entrance corridor for the purpose of screening persons entering the facility to detect the presence of weapons. Authorized staff members should be permitted to bypass the detector station by using the west entrance, where the doors should be controlled by a card-key system (see below). A feasible arrangement of ropes and stanchions is shown in Figure 3.

The arrangement of doors for access and egress also is shown in Figure 3. Its purpose is to limit access to one door in each of the two banks and limit egress to a different door in each bank. Emergency egress is to be possible through all doors. The east and west doors within the door lobby, leading to the District Court and County Court Clerks' offices, also should be locked against access while opening for emergency egress. The eight entry doors, two side doors, and the one door in the west entry to be used for staff access, should be alarmed as part of the card-key system. Additionally, all other first floor entrance doors should be locked against access and alarmed through the card-key system.

C. **Signs**

Signs should be prominently displayed explaining the locations and methods of access and egress. They should be of a permanent and weatherproof construction and should be located outside and inside the courthouse at each set of first-floor doors. Text
should be very large and legible and should be accompanied by simple graphics showing where and how access and egress are possible.

D. **Card-Key System**

The controlled-access doors should be integrated into a computer-based card-key system, either one of those now existing in county government, such as that of the Security Department, or a new system. This system should have sensors on each door which record its open/closed status, read card keys to control access, and actuate an alarm for each occurrence of an unauthorized attempt to open an access-controlled door. The central computer should record each access, maintain and use an up-to-date list of authorized card keys, and provide whatever other monitoring and reporting functions are found to be desirable. The courtroom emergency alarm system could also be tied into this system to provide reports of emergency situations and to make use of its alarm panel.

E. **Docket Adjustments**

A regular procedure should be established, including weekly or daily docket reviews, to allow the deputy in charge of the courthouse unit and the judges to make small adjustments in case schedules in order to work around temporary and unavoidable reductions in the number of courthouse deputies available for security duties on any given day.

F. **Security Operations**

Two locations not currently served by security personnel with any regularity are the juvenile hearing rooms and the domestic relations hearing room. A security presence is needed because these are the types of hearings where experience tells us that security disruptions are most likely to occur.

Either the Sheriff’s Department or the Security Department should be given that responsibility and adequate personnel and budget support should be provided.

A third group of locations, the back halls on each courtroom floor, also present some potential security problems because of the number of persons who have ready access to them. Even if public and attorney access continues, the possibility of limiting or controlling access should be considered. It is easy to visualize circumstances where friends or enemies of persons in custody could present considerable danger to judges, staff, jurors, and others in the back hall and offices. Some degree of privacy here should benefit the deliberations of judges and juries as well as increasing their security.